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Suppose we have a large population in which the individuals (males 
and females) "imprint" in the following manner. 
(H) Consider two individuals P and Q of opposite sex such that the 
complexion of Q differs from the complexion of both parents of P. Then 
P will refuse to mate with Q. 
We shall only allow the two complexions "dark" and "light". It is 
further assumed that the complexion of an individual is determined by 
a single pair of genes (which is not sex-linked). Namely, an individual 
with genotype WW or Ww has a dark complexion, while an individual 
with genotype ww has a light complexion. Note that the W gene is 
dominant. Since the mating habits of an individual depend on the com-
plexions of its two parents, it will be necessary to classify the individual 
according to one of the following six types: 
l. genotype WW, both parents necessarily dark 
2. genotype Ww, parents DD 
3. genotype Ww, parents DL or LD 
4. genotype ww, parents DD 
5. genotype ww, parents DL or LD 
6. genotype ww, parents LL. 
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Note that a WW individual cannot have any light parent, while an 
Ww individual cannot have two lights parents. By a couple of type (i, j) 
we shall mean a pair consisting of a male of type i and a female of type j. 
Consider a male of type 4. Both its parents are dark, hence, it will 
refuse to mate with a (light) female of type 4, 5, or 6. Thus a mating 
of type (4,4), (4,5) or (4,6) will never occur. Similarly, both pairs (4,1) 
and ( 4,2) are taboo because of objections on the part of the female. In 
fact, among the 36 mating types (i, j) (i, j = 1, ... , 6) only 17 types are 
admissible, the other 19 being taboo for one reason or another. 
Let N denote the number of males in the population; it is equal to 
the number of females in the population. For i = 1, ... , 6, let Pi denote 
the proportion of males which is of type i. The same type distribution 
applies to the females in the population. 
The following interesting conjecture is due to Professor MARVIN SEIGER; 
for the biological background, see his paper [7]. 
CoNJECTURE. Under "indifferent" mating, the type distribution p 
must converge to a type distribution satisfying p2=p3=p4=ps=O. In 
other words, in the limit (after many generations) we have p 1 +p6 = 1; 
that is, the population contains only homozygotes ( WW or ww) and no 
heterozygotes W w. 
Here, by "indifferent" mating we shall mean the following: 
(i) For each pair i, j = 1, ... , 6, there will initially be NpiPJ couples 
of type (i, j). This exhausts the entire population. 
(ii) A couple corresponding to an admissible type will proceed to 
mate. The (average) proportion of males oftype k (and females oftype k) 
in their offspring is equal to a known number ftJk· In particular, /121 = t, 
/234 = !, /333 = 0, /a45 = t, /556 = 1; (the reader will have no difficulty finding 
the other numbers /iJk). 
(iii) Couples corresponding to a non-admissible (taboo) type are to 
be discarded. In other words, an individual initially coupled with the 
wrong type of partner will have to remain unmated forever. 
The statement contained in the above conjecture happens to be correct. 
The proof will appear in [5] and hinges on the fact that Pl/Pa is non-
decreasing from the second generation on. 
This result raises, however, more questions than it answers. Namely, 
it seems unlikely that in nature one will encounter a population, in which 
the individuals imprint as in (H), and also follow the indifferent mating 
system defined by (i)-(iii). 
Namely, an individual initially matched with the wrong type of partner 
would normally break up this engagement and start looking for a more 
agreeable partner. 
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As an example, let IXi represent a male of type i, fJJ a female of type j, 
and suppose that (initially) lXI was matched to {Js and cxs to {Ja. Since 
both pairs (1,5} and (6,3} are taboo, all these four individuals would have 
to remain single under indifferent mating. On the other hand, both pairs 
(1,3} and (6,5) are admissible, thus, it would at least be better for each 
of the individuals concerned that lXI be matched to {33 and cxs to {Js. 
Granted that the above system of mating is a rather unnatural one, 
what then would be a natural system of mating 1 
A similar question may be asked for other populations, with m types 
of males, n types of females, and a given set r of taboo pairs (i, j). That 
is, if (i, j) E r then we do not allow a mating where the male is of type i 
and the female is of type j. In the above example, m=n=6 while r 
consists of 19 pairs (i, j}. 
In the present introduction, we shall for simplicity restrict ourselves 
to the special case that : 
(i) m=n. 
(ii) There is a constant K > 0 such that each type of admissible couple 
has on the average an offspring consisting of K males and K females. 
(iii) For each type of admissible couple (i, j) and each k= l, ... , n, 
the expected number K/iik of male offspring is equal to the expected 
number of female offspring of type k. Here, the /iik are given nonnegative 
numbers satisfying 
for each admissible pair (i, j). 
It follows from these assumptions that in the offspring of a large popu-
lation the number N of males is nearly equal to the number of females, 
while the proportion Pi of males of type i is nearly equal to the proportion 
of females of type i. 
Thus, let p~, ... , Pn be given nonnegative numbers, Pl + ... + Pn = 1, and 
consider a large population consisting of N Pi males of type i ( i = 1, ... , n) 
and N Pi females of type j (j = 1, ... , n); the vector p = (p~, ... , Pn) will 
be called the type distribution of this population. 
Question: The pairs in r being taboo, how are these N males and 
N females going to mate with each other 1 In other words, what will be 
the number Oti of couples of type (i, j), for the different pairs i, j1 Neces-
sarily, oij=O when (i, j) E rand 
.. 
(l} I Otj<.Npj, 
i=l 
for i=1, ... ,nand j=1, ... , n, respectively. 
In most applications, the latter question would be hard to answer. 
For, the answer would usually depend on a large number of (yet un-
mentioned) factors about which we may not have much precise knowledge. 
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The main purpose of the present paper is to show the usefulness of a 
much simpler approach which treats all (a priori possible) systems of 
matings on a completely equal basis. On occasion (for instance when 
taboos are present) one may want to impose a very few side conditions 
on a system of mating in order to assure that it be "reasonable" or 
"natural". 
We will not concern ourselves with the precise manner in which these 
systems are realized in nature, or the question which particular system 
is most likely to be followed by a specified type of animals. 
DEFINITION. Let Sn denote the collection of all type distributions 
p=(pl, ... ,pn), (pi;;;;,O,pl+ ... +pn=1). By a system of mating we shall 
mean a rule which associates to each p E Sn a set of n2 nonnegative numbers 
PiJ (i, j = 1, ... , n) not all zero satisfying 
(2) 
n 
1 Pw::.pi 
i-1 
n 
L Pii<P;, 
i-1 
(for i=1, ... , nand j=1, ... , n, respectively) and 
(3) Pi;=O if (i, j) E r. 
Equivalently, a system of mating may also be defined as a system 
of n2 nonnegative functions Gi;( ·)on Sn, satisfying L Gi;(p) > 0, GtJ(P) - 0 
when (i, j) E F, and i, i 
n n L Gi;(p)<Pi L Gi;(p)<Pi, 
i-1 i-1 
(for i=1, ... ,nand j=1, ... ,n, respectively). 
In practice, such a system would function as follows. If a population 
of N males and N females (N large) possesses a type distribution 
p = (p1, ... , Pn), then the members of the populations will pair up is such 
a way that the number Oi; of couples of type (i, j) is equal to 
(i, j=1, ... , n). 
Here, the Pii = Gi;(p) denote the numbers associated to p by the system 
of mating on hand. Note that indifferent mating corresponds to the 
choice Gi;(p) =PiPJ when (i, j) ¢:. F, (Gi;(p) - 0 otherwise). 
Though we shall not do so, one could also allow a non-deterministic 
behavior. That is, one could replace Gi;(p) by Gi1(p, w), where w denotes 
a random variable. 
The above system of mating does allow that some individuals remain 
unmated. Namely, of the Npi males of type i, precisely NpiJ mate with 
females of type j, (j = 1, ... , n), thus, NpiO males of type i will remain 
unmated, where 
(4) 
n 
Pio=Pt- L Pii· 
i-1 
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Similarly, Npoi females of type j will remain unmated, where 
" (5) Poi=Pi- 2 Pii· 
i~l 
The proportion 0 < c < 1 of individuals which do get mated will be called 
the mating ratio (it could vary with p). The proportion of individuals 
which remain unmated is equal to 
n n n n 
(6) 2 PiO = 2 POi= 1 - 2 2 Pii = 1 - c' 
i~l j~l i~l i~l 
(the same proportion for males as for females). 
By (6), if c=1 then PiO=O for all i, Poi=O for all j. Even if c<1 we 
may want to insist that PiO = 0 for some particular i, or Poi= 0 for some 
particular j. Such a condition can simply be handled by adding to r 
the corresponding pairs (i, 0) or (0, j). 
Next, we must explain what we mean by a "reasonable" system of 
mating. In fact, we have in mind the condition that 
(7)' PiO>O, Poi>O~ (i,j) EF, 
equivalently, 
(7)" (i, j) ¢= r~ Pio=O or Poi=O, 
for each choice of i, j = 1, ... , n. 
For, suppose PiO>O, Poi>O and (i, j) ¢= F, that is, (i, j) is admissible. 
If pw <Poi (say), it would be better for the individuals concerned if each 
of the Npw unmated males of type i would mate with an unmated female 
of type j. If they do, the resulting {P~i} would have p;0 =0. After a 
finite number of such modifications, one would obtain a system {p71} 
satisfying (7) which would be at least as desirable as the original system 
{Pii}· Thus, (7) seems a reasonable condition. It does not hold for the 
above indifferent mating system. 
However, we will not insist on (7) unless explicitly stated. If C= 1, 
then Pio=Poi=O for all i and j, so that (7) is then trivially true. 
As a further "reasonable" condition, we have 
(8)' Pt>O, Pii=o ~ (i, j) E r, 
equivalently, 
(8)" Pt>O, Pi>O, (i, j) ¢= r~ Pii>O, 
for each choice of i, j = 1, ... , n. For, Pi> 0, Pi> 0, Pii = 0 together would 
be rather surprising unless the pair (i, j) is taboo (we are thinking of large 
populations). We shall not require (8), unless explicitly stated. 
Consider a given system of mating and further a large population with 
type distribution p<o>. Suppose that this population and all the subsequent 
generations employ the system of mating on hand. Then, in principle, 
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one can compute the type distribution p<t> of the t-th generation 
(t= 1, 2, ... ). Often one will find that p<t> converges to a limit p. This 
limit is automatically an equilibrium distribution in the following sense. 
If a large population has the type distribution p, and employs a suitable 
mating matrix {PtJ}, (satisfying (2) and (3)), then its first generation 
offspring will have this same type distribution p. Usually, Pti=Gti(P) 
will do. In other words, the limiting type distribution p will usually 
satisfy 
n n 
(9) 2 2 Gtj(p)/ijk=Cpk, 
i~l i~l 
k= 1, ... , n. Here, c is a constant depending on p, in fact, precisely the 
mating ratio 
n n 
C= 2 2 Gij(p), 
i~li~l 
Provided the functions Gt1(p) are continuous on Sn, there always exists 
at least one such equilibrium distribution, compare (2.27). 
Even admitting all conceivable systems of mating, it is not necessarily 
true that each type distribution p can occur as an equilibrium distribution 
(consider the example where /tik= 0 whenever ki= 1, while /i11 = 1). Hence, 
the problem arises to determine the collection of all type distributions 
p (all p E Sn) which are in equilibrium (from generation to generation) 
under at least one system of mating. 
In fact, p = (p~, ... , Pn) E Sn belongs to this collection precisely when 
one can find nonnegative numbers Pii (i, j = 0, 1, ... , n; poo= 0) satisfying 
(10) P•1=o if (i, n E r, 
n n 
(11) 2 Pti = 2 Pii = Pi> 
i~O i~O 
(j = 1, ... , n), and 
n n 
(12) 2 2 Pti /tik = cpk, 
i~l i~l 
n n 
(k=1, ... , n). Here, c= 2 2 Ptf, O<c<l. For c fixed, the collection 
i~l i~l 
of all such systems {Pti} will be denoted by Ilc. The corresponding col-
lection of type distributions p will be denoted by Pc. That is, Pc consists 
of all p = (p1, ... , Pn) obtained from ( 11) by letting {Pii} run through Ilc. 
The advantage of keeping c fixed lies in the fact that both Ilc and Pc 
may be regarded as compact and convex polyhedral subsets of the ap-
propriate Euclidean space. Such a region is completely known as soon 
as we know its finitely many extreme points. 
The main purpose of the present paper will be to describe some of the 
relevant problems on systems of mating and their precise solutions for 
251 
a few special cases of interest. Let us now give a quick summary of the 
present paper. 
The sections l-4 are concerned with a situation somewhat more general 
than the one described so far in this introduction. Here, we have m types 
of males, n types of females, reproduction numbers Iitle and Yitr for the 
different types of male and female offspring (i, k= 1, ... , m; j, r= 1, ... , n). 
Further, a population must now be described by a pair of type distri-
butions p, q, one for males and one for females. Accordingly, we now 
define Peas the collection of all pairs p, q which are stable under at least 
one system of mating which leaves precisely a fraction 1- c of the indi-
viduals unmated. 
In section 3, the problem on hand is reformulated as a linear program-
ming type of problem. This formulation is particularly convenient when 
one is studying the extreme points of the convex region lie. The left null 
vectors of the matrix A on hand give rise to so-called invariants. In 
section 4, we give some very specific illustrations with m = 2 and n = 2 or 3. 
Starting with section 5, we go back to the case m = n, /iilc = Yitlc de-
scribed in the present introduction. Here, males and females have one 
and the same type distribution. In section 5, we consider the special 
case that /itlc= !tile and that the pairs (i, j) and (j, i) are either both taboo 
or both admissible. Provided condition (7) is not required (or C= 1), one 
may as well assume that Pii = Pii· Thus one would be interested in the 
collection lie,s of all symmetric members {Pii} of lie. 
Section 6 contains rather specific results for the further special case 
m = n = 3, c = I, where F is trivial. Much attention is given to the extreme 
points of li8 =li1,s· In the so-called "classical" case, (where the types 1, 
2 and 3 correspond to the genotypes W W, W w or ww), lis happens to 
have 5 extreme points, similarly, P=P1• 
The non-stationary case is studied in section 7. Here we are interested 
in the manner in which the type distribution changes from generation 
to generation, assuming that all the subsequent generations use one and 
the same partial system of mating. Here, "partial" refers to the fact that 
the functions Git(P) are only defined on a certain subset l:n of Sn. 
In section 8, we take up a somewhat different situation, where (for 
both males and females) the types 1 and 2 are outwardly indistinguishable. 
In that case, one would impose on {Pit} the extra condition that 
for all i and j, and one is interested in those solutions {Pii} of (10)-(12) 
which also satisfy this extra condition. Special attention is given to the 
"classical" case n = 3, with one gene dominant. 
Finally, in section 9 we present a detailed discussion of the situation 
n=3, where the pair (1,3) is taboo (and possibly also the pair (3,1)). 
We do assume condition (7). In the "classical" case, it turns out that this 
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taboo cannot cause more than 25 % unmated individuals. We also de-
termine the region IIc, depending on c (-£.;;;c.;;;1) and (3,1) E F; IIc may 
have 4, 5 or 8 extreme points. 
The solution of the original imprinting problem (where m = n = 6) will 
appear in [5]. There, we shall always insist on condition (7). The resulting 
subset of IIcis non-emptyifandonlyifco.;;;c.;;; 1. Here, co=!+! V2= .85355. 
Thus, in any equilibrium situation, no more than 15 % of the individuals 
will remain unmated. 
If we insist on both conditions (7) and (8) there is only the trivial 
solution C= 1, P1 +P6= 1. This result throws some doubts on the existence 
of an imprinting of type (H) in nature. 
Finally, we consider in [5] the somewhat different situation where only 
the males imprint. Thus, a pair (i, j) is taboo precisely when the com-
plexion of the female is different from the complexion of both parents 
of the male. In this case, r contains only 12 (instead of 19) pairs 1 .;;;i, 
i.;;; 6. Let fie denote the collection of all {Pti} E IIe satisfying both (7) 
and (8). It turns out that fie is non-empty precisely when co<c.;;; 1. The 
structure of fie happens to depend strongly on c. If C= 1, there is again 
only the trivial solution PI+ P6 = 1. Thus, an equilibrium situation with 
some heterozygotes must also have some spinsters (that is, c< 1). 
1. Terminology. 
Consider a large population consisting of M males and N females. 
Suppose the males are classified according to m different types. Here, 
the type of an individual may depend on its genotype, its phenotype, 
its parents and so on. The number of males of type i will be denoted by 
Mt=Mpt, (i=1, ... ,m). Then-tuple p=(pl, ... ,pm) is called the type 
distribution for males; it is a probability distribution in the sense that 
m 
(1.1) Pt ;;. 0 , z Pt = 1. 
i-1 
Similarly, let the set of all females be subdivided into n different types, 
N1=Nq1 females being of type j, (i = 1, ... , n). 
It is assumed that each individual mates with at most one individual 
(of the opposite sex). By a pair of type (i, j) we shall mean a couple 
where the male is of type i and the female is of type i. A couple of type 
(i, j) produces on the average /tik male offspring of type k, (k= 1, ... , m), 
and Ytik female offspring of type k, (k= 1, ... , n). The expectation numbers 
/tik and Ytik will be regarded as known. 
In some way or another, the males and females in the given population 
pair up. Let Oti denote the total number of couples of type (i, i), 
(i=1, ... ,m; j=1, ... ,n). 
We shall allow that some individuals remain unmated. Let Oto denote 
the number of males of type i which remain unmated, similarly, Oo1 as 
the number of females of type i which remain unmated. It will be con-
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venient to employ the convention Coo= 0. Observe that we must have 
(1.2} 
for i=1, ... ,m; j=1, ... ,n. 
In most applications, one does not know much about the mechanism 
which leads to the final formation of pairs (couples). This formation will 
usually take some time and may involve inborn habits, environment, 
certain preferences and taboos, competition and so on. 
Nevertheless, all that matters to us is the resulting set of (m+ 1)(n+ 1) 
numbers 0~,1 and not the particular way they were arrived at. And at 
least a priori, any set of nonnegative numbers 0~,1 , which satisfies (1.2}, 
could arise in this way. Strictly speaking, theM~,, Ni and C~,i should even 
be integers; however, we consider here only very large populations. 
In view of this, we will define a system of mating as a rule (recipe) which 
associates with each given set of m+n nonnegative numbers {M1, ... , Mm; 
N1. ... , Nn} anew set of nonnegative numbers {C~,i; i=O, ... , m; j=O, ... , n; 
Ooo=O} satisfying (1.2). Equivalently, a rule for determining mn numbers 
Cu (i=1, ... ,m; j=1, ... ,n) satisfying 
(1.3) 
However, we shall always impose the following homogeneity condition 
on any system of mating. Namely, if {Cii} corresponds to the numbers 
M~,, N1 and K is a positive constant then the system {O;;} corresponding 
to the new numbers M;=KM~,, N;=KNi is given by c;;=KC1i· 
A very special system of mating is obtained by letting 
(1.4) 
(for 1..;;i..;;m; 1..;;j..;;n); here, k is a fixed constant, O<k<l. The special 
case k= 1 of (1.4) will be called the random mating system. In certain 
situations this system may not be admissible, for instance, when we 
know that there exist taboos dictating that C~,1=0 for certain pairs (i, j). 
2. Offspring and stability. 
Let Ft denote the population consisting of all the t-th generation 
offspring, (k= 1, 2, ... ). The original population may be denoted as Fo 
We shall assume that only members of the same generation can mate 
each other. 
Let us further assume that all the subsequent generations Ft employ 
one and the same system of mating. Knowing this system, one 
can in principle determine the type distributions from generation to 
generation. 
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More precisely, let M<t>, Pit>, etc. denote the (expected) number M, 
pi, etc. taken for Ft instead of Fo. It is easily seen that 
n m m 
(2.1) M<t> = ! ! o~J- 11 ! /iik 
i-1 i-1 k-1 
and 
m " (2.2) M~1 =M<tlp~1 = L ! OH- 11 /ijk, 
i-1 i-1 
(t= I, 2, ... ; k= 1, ... , rn). Similarly, 
(2.3) 
and 
(2.4) 
m " " N (t) = ~ ~ 0~,~-1) ~ 
.::., .::., • .::., Yiir 
i-1 i-1 T-1 
m " N~t>=N<tlq~tl= ! L ou-1>gijr, 
i-1 i-1 
(t=1,2, ... ; r=l, ... ,n). 
Lett;;. 1. Knowing the rn numbers Mit- 1>, the n numbers N}1- 11 and 
the system of mating on hand, one computes the numbers O~J- 11 • After-
wards, the above formulae yield the numbers Mit> and N}t>. And so on. 
In many applications, the following will happen: 
(i) As t--+ =, the type distribution p<t> =(pit>, ... , p:!1) for males 
converges to a limit p=(pi, ... ,pm). Similarly, the type distribution 
q<tl = (qit>, ... , q~1 ) for females converges to a limit q = (q~, ... , qn). 
(ii) As t--+ =, the ratio M<t>jN<t> of males to females converges to 
a finite positive constant y. 
(iii) The Pi and qi together with y have the following property. If a 
large population has a proportion Pi of males of type i, (i= 1, ... , rn), a 
proportion qi of females of type j, (j = 1, ... , n), and a ratio y of males 
to females, then the same is true for all the subsequent generations 
(provided each generation employs the system of mating on hand). 
From now on, we shall only be interested in populations having a 
fixed sex ratio MfN =y. Here, y is a given positive number, soon to be 
taken as y = 1. 
Consider a pair of type distributions 
p= (pi, ... , Pm), 
(where p satisfies (1.1), a similar restriction holding for q). If this pair 
has the above property (iii), then it will be called a stable pair relative 
to the given system of mating. By a feasible pair we shall mean a pair 
of type distributions which is stable with respect to at least one system 
of mating. 
Given a large population in nature, which is more or less in equilibrium, 
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one may expect that the type distributions p and q for males and females 
together form a feasible pair (usually with a sex ratio y = l ). Thus, it 
is of interest to determine the (possibly empty) collection of all feasible 
pairs and, further, for each feasible pair the collection of all systems of 
mating relative to which the given pair is stable. 
In actual applications, one has often reasons to believe that the system 
of mating, used by the population under study, sg,tisfies certain special 
conditions. Then the question arises which pairs p, q of type distributions 
are stable relative to at least one system of mating satisfying these special 
conditions. 
For instance, suppose that the males of type l and 2 differ only in 
their genotype, but not in their phenotype, behavior, etc. Then there 
would be no reason why they would behave differently, or why they 
would be treated differently by others. Hence, in this case, one would 
only be interested in mating systems satisfying the special condition 
(2.5) (j=O,l, ... ,n). 
Some situations of this type will be discussed in Section 8. 
We shall, however, pay more attention to conditions requiring that 
Cii = 0 for one or more prescribed pairs (i, j). Such a pair is then said 
to be taboo. The pairs which are not taboo will be called admissible. 
Let Tdenote the set ofpairs (i, j) which are taboo, (O.;;;i.;;;m; O,;;;;;j,;;;;;n); 
thus, if (i, j) E r then necessarily cij = 0. In view of our convention that 
0 00 =0, we may as well include the pair (0, 0) in the set r. In many 
applications, (0, 0) would be the only element in r. 
In this connection, we sometimes impose the condition that 
(2.6) if (i, j) ¢'. r then either Cw = 0 or CoJ = 0, 
whenever l.;;:i.;;:m, l,;;;;;j,;;;;;n. In other words, if both Cw>O and 0 01 >0 
(so that there are unmated m'1les of type i and also unmated females 
of type j) then the pair (i, j) must be taboo; (in particular, cij = 0). If 
all pairs (i,j) with l,;;;;;i.;;:m, l.;;;j.;;;n are admissible, then (2.6) would 
imply that either CiO = 0 for all i > l (no unmated males) or 0 01 = 0 for 
all j > l (no unmated females). 
Next, we sometimes impose the more questionable condition that 
(2.7) 
whenever l,;;;;; i,;;;;; m, l,;;;;; j,;;;;; n. In other words, if the population does 
contain males of type i and also females of type j and the pair (i, j) is 
in principle admissible then the system of mating should lead to at least 
some pairs of type (i, j). For, otherwise, it would seem as if the pair (i, j) 
were taboo; recall that we are thinking of large populations. 
The problem of determining all feasible pairs will be approached as 
follows. We are given the nonnegative numbers /iJk and giJr with i and k 
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running through {1, 2, ... , m}, j and r running through {1, 2, ... , n}. 
Further, r is a given set of pairs (i, j) with O,;;;;i,;;;;m, O.;;;j,;;;;n such that 
at least (0, 0) E r. We are interested in finding systems {Oi1; i = 0, 1, ... , m; 
j=O, 1, ... , n} of nonnegative numbers satisfying 
m n n 
(2.8) 
_L _L Oii/iik= a _L Okr, 
i~l i~l r~o 
(k= 1, ... , m), and 
m n m 
(2.9) 
_L _L Oii giir = a _L Okr, 
i~l i~l k~O 
(r= 1, ... , n), compare (1.2), (2.2) and (2.4). Here, a denotes a positive 
constant (which may vary with the system {Oi1}). Moreover, {Oi1} should 
satisfy the special side conditions imposed; in particular, Oi1=0 for all 
(i, j) E r. 
Afterwards (provided MfN =y) the formulae 
n m 
Mi= _L Oii , M = _L Mi , Pi=Mi/M; 
(2.10) i~O i~l 
m n 
N 1= .L oij , N= _L N 1 , q1=N1/N, 
i~o i~l 
yield a feasible pair p = (p1, ... , Pm), q = (qb ... , qn) of type distributions 
(and each feasible pair can be obtained in this manner). 
After all, consider a population consisting of Mt=Mpi males of type i 
(i= 1, ... , m) and N 1=Nq1 females of type j (j= 1, ... , n). By (2.10), it is 
possible for them to pair up in such a way that, for each pair (i, j) with 
1,;;;;i,;;;;m, 1,;;;;j.;;;n, there are precisely Ot1 couples of type (i, j). 
Suppose they do pair up in this manner. Then, by (2.8) and (2.9), in 
the first generation offspring the expected number of males of type k is 
equal to aMk= (aM)pk, (k= 1, ... , m), while the expected number of 
females of type r is equal to aN r = ( aN)qr, ( r = 1, ... , n). In particular, 
on the average the offspring will contain aM males and aN females so 
that its sex ratio is equal to MfN =y. 
We conclude that the above pair of type distributions p, q is stable 
for any mating system, which associates to the above special set of 
numbers Mt and N1 precisely the above special set {OiJ}. This proves 
that the pair p, q is a feasible pair. 
In the future, we shall always assume (as is true in many applications) 
that for each couple the expected number of male offspring is equal to 
the expected number of female offspring. More precisely, we assume that 
m n 
(2.11) L /tik = L gijr, 
k~l r~l 
for all i = 1, ... , m; j = 1, ... , n; (soon we shall strengthen this requirement 
as in (2.12)). 
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Then for any offspring the expected number of males is equal to the 
expected number of females. Therefore, one would only be interested in 
populations satisfying M =N. In fact, from now on we assume that 
M=N, y=l. 
Consider a set of numbers {Cii} as in (2.8)-(2.10), but now with M =N. 
That is, 
by ( 1.2). Equivalently, 
m " ! Ow= ! Co1=(1-c)N, 
i-1 i-1 
say. In other words, if M =N then the number of unmated males is equal 
to the number of unmated females (and only then). Note that 1-c is 
equal to the proportion of unmated individuals within each sex, 0..;;; c < 1. 
Further, the number eN of males which do get mated is equal to the 
number of females which do get mated and also equal to the number of 
couples formed: 
m " ! ! Ci1=cN. 
i-1 i-1 
We shall call c the mating ratio of the solution {Cii} on hand. 
In the future, we shall assume for convenience that the expected 
number of offspring is the same for each couple; (this assumption could 
be avoided). That is, we will strengthen (2.11) to the assumption that 
for all i = 1, ... , m; j = 1, ... , n; here, K denotes a positive constant. 
Dividing all /iik and giir by K, we may as well assume that 
(2.12) 
for all i = 1, ... , m; j = 1, ... , n. Clearly, this normalization has no influence 
on the set of nonnegative solutions {Ct1} of (2.8)-(2.10). 
Summarizing, we assume the existence of a constant K > 0 such that 
each type of couple has on the average K males and K females in its 
offspring. The expected number of male offspring of type k, for a couple 
of type (i, j), is denoted by K/iik· Similarly, Kgiir for the female offspring 
of type r. 
In the future, we shall prefer to work with ratios 
Pii=Cii/N. 
In terms of the Pu our problem reads as follows. 
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Determine all sets of nonnegative numbers {Pii; i = 0, l, ... , m; 
j=O, l, ... , n} satisfying Pti=O for (i, j) E rand, further, 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
and 
(2.15) 
m n m n 
L L PiJ = L L Pii = l' 
i~l i~O i~O i~l 
m n 
L L PtJ!ijk=Cpk, 
i~l i~l 
m n 
L L PtJatfr=Cqr, 
i~l i~l 
(k= l, ... , m), 
(r= l, ... , n). 
Here, the Pk and qr are defined by 
n m 
(2.16) Pk= L Pkr , qr= L Pkr· 
r~o k~o 
Thus, Pk > 0, Pl + ... + Pm = l and, similarly, for the qr. Further, c is a 
constant satisfying O<c< l, (the case c=O being of no interest). Note 
that 
m n m n 
(2.17) L L Pti=c, thus, L Pto = L Po1= 1-c, 
i~l i~l i~l i~l 
by (2.12) and (2.14) or (2.15). In fact, given (2.14)-(2.16), all the five 
relations (2.13) and (2.17) are equivalent. 
Unless otherwise stated, we shall not require any of the conditions 
(2.5), (2.6) or (2. 7). On the other hand, if we would insist on condition 
(2.6) and all pairs (i, j) with l.;;;i.;;;m, l.;;;j.;;;n are admissible then neces-
sarily c= l, compare the remark following (2.6). 
Given two solutions {p;i }, {p~i} of the above problem corresponding 
to the same value c, any convex linear combinations 
(2.18) 
(i=O, l, ... ,m; j=O, 1, ... ,n; O<~X<l fixed), would also be a solution 
corresponding to this value c; (this would not necessarily be the case if 
we had added one or more of the conditions (2.5)-(2. 7)). 
Therefore, the set of solutions {PtJ} with c fixed corresponds to a convex 
region lie in (m+ 1)(n+ I)-dimensional space (with coordinates PtJ). More 
precisely, lie is the (possibly empty) polyhedral region obtained as the 
intersection of finitely many hyperplanes (with equations (2.13)-(2.15); 
PiJ = 0 when ( i, j) E T) and further finitely many closed halfspaces of the 
form Pti > 0. In particular, lie is closed and even compact (since 0 <Pti < l 
in lie). 
By an extreme point of lie we mean an element {Pii} in lie which cannot 
be represented as a convex linear combination (2.18) of two other elements 
of lie. By well-known theorems [3], we have that the present region lie 
has only a finite number of extreme points {pJ;'}, A= l, ... , v, say. More-
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over, flc is precisely the collection of all convex linear combinations of 
these v points: 
• (2.19) PiJ= ! £X;.P1fl, 
J.=l 
(i = 0, 1, ... , m; j = 0, 1, ... , n). Here, £X1, ... ,£X. denote arbitrary numbers 
satisfying lX;.;;;;. 0 and ! lX;. = l. 
Let Pc denote the collection of all pairs (p, q) obtained from (2.16) by 
letting {PiJ} run through flc. Thus, Pc consists precisely of the pairs (p, q) 
of type distributions which are stable under at least one method of mating 
which leaves a fraction 1 - c of the individuals of each sex unmated. 
By (2.16) and (2.19), Pc corresponds to a compact polyhedral region 
in (m+n)-dimensional space (with coordinates Pi and qJ). Moreover, each 
of the finitely many extreme points of Pc arises through the linear transfor-
mation (2.16) from some extreme point of flc. On the other hand, an 
extreme point of flc does not necess::trily yield an extreme point of Pc. 
It is of interest to know when flc is non-empty. 
THEOREM 2.1. Suppose there are no non-trivial taboos. Let 0 <c.;;;; 1 be 
fixed. Then flc is non-empty. 
Much more can be said, whether or not there are non-trivial taboos. 
Let 
with the usual topology; (essentially,Smis an (m-1)-dimensional simplex). 
Similarly, 
For i=O, 1, ... , m and j=O, 1, ... , n, let 
be a given non-negative and continuous function on Sm x Sn, (Foo = 0), 
such that the following identities hold throughout Sm x Sn. First, 
m 
(2.20) ! FiJ(p,q)=qt ; 
i=O 
n 
! Fit(p, q) =Pi, 
i=O 
for j = 1, ... , n and i = 1, ... , m, respectively. Moreover, 
m n 
(2.21) ! ! Fit(p,q)=c. 
i=l ;=1 
We now assert that there exists a nonnegative system {Pii; i = 0, 1, ... , m; 
j=O, 1, ... , n} satisfying all the relations (2.13)-(2.17) and, moreover, 
(2.22) 
for i=O, 1, ... , m; j=O, 1, ... , n. Here, the Pi and qi are defined by (2.16). 
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Proof. Consider the mapping U: (p, q) --+ (p*, q*) of Sm x Sn into 
itself defined by 
(2.23} 
(compare (2.12)}. Here, k= 1, ... , m; r= 1, ... , n. Clearly, U is a continuous 
map; (a useful interpretation of U is supplied by (3.17} and (3.18}). By 
the Brouwer fixed point theorem, there exists a point (p, q) E Sm x Sn 
such that U(p, q) = (p, q). Given such a point, and putting 
(i=O, 1, ... , m; j=O, 1, ... , n}, we obtain a system {Pti} having the stated 
properties. 
If {Ft1( ·)} can be chosen such that FH(p, q) = 0 for all (i, j) E r, then 
the above system {Pti} would belong to lie so that lie is non-empty. 
To prove that lie is non-empty in the special case that r is trivial, one 
merely chooses Fti(p, q) =Cpiqi, Fw(p, q) = (1-c)pt, Foi(p, q) = (1-c)qJ, 
(i=1, ... ,m; j=1, ... ,n). In this way, it even follows that lie contains 
at least one (so-called random) member {Pti} satisfying 
(2.24) (i> 1, j;;;. 1). 
Here, the Pi and qi are defined by (2.16). 
Starting with Section 5, we shall assume that m=n and that fiik=Yiik 
for all i, j, k; let us also adopt this assumption throughout the remainder 
of the present section. Now, (2.14) and (2.15) together imply that Pk=qk 
(k= 1, ... , n}, thus, we are only interested in the case p=q. Hence, in 
the present case, one should replace the above Fu(p, q) by nonnegative 
continuous functions Gii(P) on s ... Further, (2.20) and (2.21) are to be 
replaced by the identities 
(2.25} 
(i= 1, ... , n}, and 
.. .. 
(2.26) ! ! Gti(P)=c. 
i=l i =1 
Suppose further that Gtj(p) = 0 for each (i, j) E r. It follows from the 
Brouwer fixed point theorem that the mapping p --+ p*, from Sn into Sn, 
defined by 
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(k= 1, ... , n}, has at least one fixed point p E Sn. For each such fixed point, 
{Pii=GiJ(p)} yields a member of Ilc satisfying 
(2.27) 
for all i, j = 0, 1, ... , n. Here 
n n 
Pi= L PtJ= L PJi· 
i~O i=O 
Let us now suppose that r is trivial, that is, no pair (i, j) =F (0, 0) is 
taboo. Then Ilc is non-empty since there do exist systems {GtJ( ·)}having 
the required properties. In fact, one can choose GiJ(P) =CPiPJ, Gw(p) = 
=Goi(P) = (1-c)pi, (i, j = 1, ... , n). Consequently, Ilc contains at least one 
member {PiJ} of the special form 
(2.28) (i> 1, j> 1). 
One can also choose Gu(p)=cpi, Gw(p)=Goi(p)=(1-c)pi, (i=1, ... , n,} 
G11(p) = 0, otherwise. It follows that Ilc contains at least one member 
satisfying 
(2.29} 
(i, j = 1, ... , n). Note that, by (2.14}, the latter result is essentially equiva-
lent to the existence of a non-trivial nonnegative solution of the system 
(2.30) 
n 
L Pi /uk = Pk, 
i=l 
(k= 1, ... , n). 
Since Ctk=/iik satisfies Cik>O and L Cik= 1, (i, k= 1, ... , n}, this existence 
k 
also follows by a well-known theorem [1] on nonnegative matrices. 
(To be continued) 
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